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This article examines a snapshot in time of appeals in negligence cases to the High Court 
during the first 11 years of the 21st century. In total, 78 negligence cases decided by the 
High Court during this period are analysed. Cases granted leave to appeal to the 
High Court are exceptional, raising novel or difficult issues of law and depend upon an 
injured plaintiff ’s practical and financial ability to access legal services. This article 
analyses the gender and age of litigants, and the accident type in these appeals in order to 
determine what, if anything, can be learnt about tort litigation patterns. This study found 
that more men litigated in High Court appeals in the period under study than any other 
group. When analysed against the background of existing evidence as to: the nature and 
type of injuries suffered in Australia which require hospitalisation; who is injured; who 
litigates at first instance; who appeals; and the nature of negligence cases, it becomes clear 
that adult male plaintiffs appear more often in tort law than women and children due to 
more men being injured as a group and female and child injuries happening more often 
in no-fault contexts. The data also indicate that plaintiffs are far less likely to succeed in 
negligence appeals to the High Court than defendants. It is argued that this emphasis 
upon personal responsibility in the tort of negligence seems set to continue in light of the 
statutory tort law reforms which took place across Australia in 2002. 
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I   I N T R O D U C T IO N 
This article examines particular features of cases in negligence law that find 
their way to the High Court. The analysis in this article is based upon a 
database constructed through identifying and coding High Court cases from 
the beginning of 2000 to the close of 2010, where the cause of action was the 
tort of negligence.1 This article discusses data findings as to the plaintiff 
attributes of age, gender, accident type and litigant success rates.2  
The difficulties in accessing negligence compensation in a timely, just and 
effective manner through the Australian court system have been oft-analysed 
and deeply lamented.3 The findings of this study support this long history of 
critical scholarly writing, promoting a rethink of the framework of compensa-
tion for tortious conduct. This article contributes empirical analysis of the law 
to this debate, such analysis having traditionally been relatively rare in legal 
research4 and in the study of the tort of negligence in particular.5 Importantly, 
however, there are limitations as to the inferences and implications that can be 
 
 1 This analysis includes cases which discuss vicarious liability and non-delegable duty. See the 
Appendix for a full list of the cases coded. The High Court cases selected were all decisions 
where the substantive issues decided by the High Court related to liability in the tort of 
negligence, although the data set includes cases where the High Court appeal was not deter-
minative of liability or quantum of damages, including cases which resolved an issue between 
defendants, a procedural issue or a revocation of special leave. 
 2 See Part IV below for a discussion as to methodology and coding of success rates. 
 3 See, eg, Harold Luntz, ‘Reform of the Law of Negligence: Wrong Questions — Wrong 
Answers’ (2002) 25 University of New South Wales Law Journal 836; Harold Luntz, ‘A View 
from Abroad’ [2008] New Zealand Law Review 97; Regina Graycar, ‘Hoovering as a Hobby 
and Other Stories: Gendered Assessments of Personal Injury Damages’ (1997) 31 University 
of British Columbia Law Review 17; Regina Graycar and Jenny Morgan, The Hidden Gender of 
Law (Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2002) (‘The Hidden Gender of Law (2nd ed)’). 
 4 Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal Civil Justice 
System, Report No 89 (1999) 72 [1.43]. There are trending exceptions to this: see, eg, Andrew 
Lynch and George Williams, ‘The High Court on Constitutional Law: The 2010 Statistics’ 
(2010) 34 University of New South Wales Law Journal 1030. 
 5 There are prominent exceptions: see, eg, Luntz, ‘A View from Abroad’, above n 3; Harold 
Luntz, ‘Turning Points in the Law of Torts in the Last 30 Years’ (2003) 15 Insurance Law 
Journal 1, 22; Harold Luntz, ‘Torts Turnaround Downunder’ (2001) 1 Oxford University 
Commonwealth Law Journal 95, 96–8; E W Wright, ‘National Trends in Personal Injury 
Litigation: Before and after “Ipp”’ (2006) 14 Torts Law Journal 233. 
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drawn from empirical studies. In this study, for example, High Court deci-
sions only reveal the litigants who were given special leave to appeal. As such, 
this study does not examine the general population of people who suffered 
injuries for whom somebody else might bear responsibility, nor the litigants 
who could not afford to pursue their claim, were denied leave to appeal, 
settled, or did not have the resilience to go on. The numbers presented in this 
article are therefore not intended as an end in themselves but rather to 
provide a foundation for more detailed consideration. 
Indeed, it is perhaps ambitious to test any hypothesis as to which features 
of cases may result in High Court appeals, given the very small number of not 
necessarily representative cases that end up in that court. For this reason, the 
findings of the study are placed in the wider context of available relevant 
evidence of personal injury and litigation. Part II therefore begins by  
discussing Australian hospital admission statistics as to gender- and age-based 
accident rates and types. These data indicate that women and children are not 
injured in the same way as men. The evidence presented adds weight to the 
view that the disparity between men, and women and children with respect to 
negligence claims may be due to the architecture of the tort system itself. 
Part III draws together evidence on litigation rates, and age and gender. The 
choice to litigate involves decisions as to time, cost, and emotional energy, and 
an appeal no doubt intensifies such experiences. The motivation and ability to 
litigate are complex phenomena and are seemingly not explained by any one 
factor — including plaintiff characteristics such as age and gender. 
Following this background, Part IV details the outcomes and methodology 
of the study. The study examines plaintiffs who have suffered personal injury 
and are parties to High Court appeals, as either the appellant or the respond-
ent, in cases where the cause of action is negligence. It evidences that adult 
males are involved in more High Court negligence actions than women and 
children combined.6 The findings also support the work of tort law scholars 
suggesting a shift in the ideology of High Court negligence decisions towards 
personal responsibility.7 Indeed, in this study, defendants were successful in 
 
 6 This finding is not out of step with international research on this issue, where women and 
children are two of many groups historically identified as disadvantaged in seeking access to 
justice. For example, it has been suggested that litigants with limited resources are less likely 
to succeed on appeal than their better-resourced counterparts: see Donald R Songer and 
Reginald S Sheehan ‘Who Wins on Appeal? Upperdogs and Underdogs in the United States 
Courts of Appeals’ (1992) 36 American Journal of Political Science 235. 
 7 See Luntz, ‘Turning Points in the Law of Torts in the Last 30 Years’, above n 5; Chief Justice 
J J Spigelman, ‘Tort Law Reform: An Overview’ (2006) 14 Tort Law Review 5, 8; Justice 
G L Davies, ‘Negligence: Where Lies the Future?’ (Speech delivered at the Supreme and 
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64 per cent of High Court appeals over the 11-year period. It is argued that 
this relatively poor success rate for injured plaintiffs is unlikely to change, 
especially given that the objective of the 2002 tort law reform legislation8 was 
to redress a perceived imbalance in the law of negligence favouring the 
plaintiff over the defendant.9 Part IV details the restrictive impact of tort law 
reform legislation upon access to compensation for personal injury through 
another’s negligence with a particular focus on age and gender. It concludes 
that the tort law reforms may more adversely affect the ability of women and 
children to pursue negligence actions than that of men. This study thus 
provides a platform which may be built upon by future studies to shed light 
on the development of the law of negligence and possible limitations in the 
architecture of the law of negligence. 
II   ( I N)JU S T IC E  A N D  T H E  LAW  O F  N E G L IG E N C E:   
A C C I D E N T  LO C AT IO N S   
The law of negligence has the primary objectives of compensation, deterrence 
and loss spreading,10 yet there remains a large residue of injuries which are 
non-compensable. In 2011, a Productivity Commission inquiry into disability 
noted that 
Australia-wide, only about half of catastrophic injuries are compensated 
through insurance, with the supports required for the remainder covered 
 
Federal Court Judges’ Conference on the Ipp Report, Adelaide, 23 January 2003); Barbara 
McDonald, ‘The Impact of the Civil Liability Legislation on Fundamental Policies and Princi-
ples of the Common Law of Negligence’ (2006) 14 Torts Law Journal 268; Prue Vines, ‘Fault, 
Responsibility and Negligence in the High Court of Australia’ (2000) 8 Tort Law Review 130. 
See generally Kylie Burns, ‘Distorting the Law: Politics, Media and the Litigation Crisis: An 
Australian Perspective’ (2007) 15 Torts Law Journal 195; David Partlett, ‘Of Law Reform Lions 
and the Limits of Tort Reform’ (2005) 27 Sydney Law Review 417; Peter Cane, ‘Taking Disa-
greement Seriously: Courts, Legislatures and the Reform of Tort Law’ (2005) 25 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 393; Andrew Field, ‘“There Must Be a Better Way”: Personal Injuries 
Compensation since the “Crisis in Insurance”’ (2008) 13 Deakin Law Review 67. 
 8 See Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW); Personal Injuries 
(Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT); Personal Injuries (Civil Claims) Act 2003 (NT); Civil 
Liability Act 2003 (Qld); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas); Wrongs 
Act 1958 (Vic); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA). 
 9 Panel of Eminent Persons, Review of the Law of Negligence: Final Report (2002) 25–6  
[1.4]–[1.6] (‘Ipp Report’). 
 10 Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330, 375 [123] (Gummow J). 
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through (generally inadequate) taxpayer-funded health and disability ser-
vices.11  
Injuries that result in negligence litigation are likely to be serious or cata-
strophic and to occur in circumstances where loss will be recouped through 
insurance. Negligence litigation may only be pursued where the injury results 
in the kind of disability which is recognised by law as falling within one of the 
traditional heads of damage giving rise to valuable compensation. This is 
confirmed by the Productivity Commission inquiry, which states that reliance 
on common law compensation will only succeed if a plaintiff ‘can identify a 
negligent and solvent first party as the cause of the accident’ and that 
[t]he practical consequence for people acquiring disability is that the amount, 
nature and timeliness of support depends on the type of accident, its exact cir-
cumstances and location. This can have very lasting impacts for people with 
catastrophic injury.12  
Thus, the location of injury and the consequent ability of a plaintiff to 
attribute fault to a solvent defendant are two of the driving explanations 
behind the initiation of negligence litigation. 
Consequently, tort law compensates negligently caused disabilities, which 
occur more frequently to men than to any other group. Luntz et al explain this 
gendered disparity of Australian personal injury claims as follows: 
Men and women do not suffer personal injuries statistically in identical or often 
even similar ways. Women are considered to be significantly more risk averse 
than men. Men are injured and killed more than women, particularly from in-
juries which arise from risk-taking behaviours and hazardous occupations.13 
Luntz et al have drilled through the data as to hospital separations14 to focus 
on community injury incidents (that is, injuries typically sustained in places 
 
 11 Productivity Commission, ‘Disability Care and Support’ (Inquiry Report No 54, 10 August 
2011) 820. 
 12 Ibid 790. 
 13 Harold Luntz et al, Torts: Cases and Commentary (LexisNexis Butterworths, 7th ed, 2013) 84 
[1.6.1]. 
 14 The Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (‘AIHW’) defines ‘separation’ as ‘the episode of 
admitted patient care, which can be a total hospital stay (from admission to discharge, trans-
fer or death) or a portion of a hospital stay beginning or ending in a change of type of care 
(for example, from acute care to rehabilitation)’ and ‘the process by which an admitted pa-
tient completes an episode of care by being discharged, dying, being transferred to another 
hospital or by a change of care type’: AIHW, ‘Australian Hospital Statistics 2010–11’ (Health 
Services Series No 43, April 2012) 14. 
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such as the home, workplace or street),15 noting that the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (‘ABS’) confirmed that ‘[i]n 2010 men were far more likely than 
women to die from an external cause (such as transport accident, fall, 
poisoning, suicide)’.16 The ABS has also stated that ‘[m]ales are … more prone 
to risky behaviours, particularly in early years of adult life, which together 
result in higher death rates due to accidents’.17 
The point made above, that men are more likely to suffer an injury which 
may be compensated through a negligence action, is further underlined 
through an examination of injuries which occur at home. In order to maintain 
an action in negligence, there must be a person other than the victim at fault 
and the wrongdoer must be solvent. As Graycar observes, at home ‘there is 
rarely anyone that can be sued’.18 Accordingly, claims at home will generally 
only be made if there is some form of product liability. As most household 
insurance will be third party (there to protect the homeowner from the 
liability that would flow from injuring someone else) rather than first party, it 
will not necessarily respond to the injury of a resident. While a large number 
of injuries that occur at home require hospitalisation, this figure is gendered. 
The 2009–10 Australian hospital data identify more women than men being 
injured at home: 
Where information was available, 26% of all hospitalised community injuries 
occurred in the home. A higher proportion of female injuries occurred in the 
home compared with male injuries (35% versus 19%) or in a residential institu-
tion (9% versus 3%). Males were more likely than females to have been injured 
on a street or highway, as well as in sports and athletics, trade and service, and 
industrial and construction areas and farms.19 
 
 15 However, this data is not comprehensive as ‘[a] larger number of generally minor cases do not 
receive medical treatment. In addition, a smaller number of severe injuries that quickly result 
in death go unrecorded in terms of hospital separations, but are captured in mortality data’: 
Renate Kreisfeld and James E Harrison, ‘Hospital Separations Due to Injury and Poisoning 
2005–06’ (Injury Research and Statistics Series No 55, AIHW, 2010) 1. 
 16 Luntz et al, above n 13, 84 [1.6.1] n 182, citing ABS, Causes of Death, Australia, 2010 (ABS 
Catalogue No 3303.0, 20 March 2012). 
 17 ABS, Gender Indicators, Australia, Jan 2012 (ABS Catalogue No 4125.0, 7 February 2012). 
 18 Reg Graycar, ‘Teaching Torts as if the World Really Existed: Reflections on Harold Luntz’s 
Contribution to Australian Law School Classrooms’ (2003) 27 Melbourne University Law 
Review 677, 679. 
 19 Amanda Tovell et al, ‘Hospital Separations Due to Injury and Poisoning, Australia: 2009–10’ 
(Injury Research and Statistics Series No 69, AIHW, 2012) v. 
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This supports the argument that women, due to the location of their injury, 
may be less able than men to litigate in negligence. 
This evidence is further supported by general data on the frequency of 
injury leading to hospitalisation. Generally, if women are less likely to be 
injured than men in the first place, they will be less likely to litigate negligence 
actions and there will be fewer women in the legal system. The same is true in 
reverse.20 However, here it is interesting to note that Australian females 
actually have more hospitalisations than males. In 2010–11, overall there were 
about 4.6 million separations for females compared with about 4.2 million 
separations for males.21 In terms of hospital emergency admissions, in  
2011–12 males accounted for only slightly more than half of emergency 
presentations.22 These data have remained fairly constant over time.23 Simply 
put then, it is possible that women may not litigate — not because they are 
injured less often — but because they are injured less often in common law 
categories of claim. 
Replicating Luntz et al’s approach to the use of hospital admission data, 
children may also be differentiated from men in terms of statistical type and 
location of injury. The 2011–12 Australian hospital emergency admissions 
data show that the most common age group reported for the 6.5 million 
emergency department presentations was 0–4 years (12 per cent), followed by 
20–24 years (8 per cent).24 In 2005–06,  
 
 20 See the discussion of the gender difference in injuries to women historically, caused by the 
clothing they wore, when boarding and disembarking from trains: Margo Schlanger, ‘Injured 
Women before Common Law Courts, 1860–1930’ (1998) 21 Harvard Women’s Law Journal 
79, 114–18. 
 21 AIHW, ‘Hospital Statistics 2010–11’, above n 14, 148. The AIHW also reported that during 
this period ‘there were more separations per 1,000 population for females than for males aged 
15 to 54’. At 30 June 2010, the sex ratio of the total population for Australia was 99.2 males 
per 100 females: ABS, Population by Age and Sex, Australian States and Territories (ABS 
Catalogue No 3201.0, 21 December 2010). 
 22 AIHW, ‘Australian Hospital Statistics 2011–12: Emergency Department Care’ (Health 
Services Series No 45, December 2012) 9. 
 23 In 1998–99, females accounted for 53 per cent of total separations in public hospitals and 
56 per cent in private hospitals: AIHW, ‘Australian Hospital Statistics 1998–99’ (Health Ser-
vices Series No 15, 2000) 75–6. Females also accounted for more patient days than males: 
at 76. Similarly, national hospital data for 2009–10 show 4.5 million hospital separations for 
females as opposed to 4.1 million separations for males: AIHW, ‘Australian Hospital Statistics 
2009–10’ (Health Services Series No 40, April 2011) 142. 
 24 AIHW, ‘Hospital Statistics 2011–12: Emergency Department’, above n 22, 9. Overall it is 
difficult to accurately state the number of separations for children (persons aged under 18) in 
hospital as the data is grouped as persons aged 5–14 years and then 15–24 years: AIHW, 
‘Hospital Statistics 2010–11’, above n 14, 188. 
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for very young children aged 0–4 years, the most common specific causes of in-
jury were falls (39%) and poisoning by drugs (7%). Falls were also the most 
common injury for older children aged 5–14 years (43%), followed by transport 
accidents (19%). The most common causes of injury for young adults aged  
15–24 years were transport accidents (21%), falls (12%), assault (11%) and in-
tentional self-harm (10%).25 
At first blush, these data replicate the statistics with respect to women, in that 
the location of injury for a child tends not to be where a third party defendant 
is readily recognisable. Similarly to women, the above statistics reveal that it is 
common for children’s injuries to occur at home. Medical data from 2005–06 
confirms that children aged 0–14 years were most likely to sustain fall injuries 
in the home, followed by at school, and in sports and athletic areas.26 Similar-
ly, poisoning by drugs (7 per cent of total injuries) is most likely to occur at 
home. As noted previously, it is unlikely that claims will be made for children’s 
injuries sustained at home unless there is a defective product involved, as the 
parents are likely to be the only identifiable defendants.27 A now dated 1978 
United Kingdom Royal Commission report offered two possible explanations 
for such lack of compensation available for children through tort law in 
England, noting: 
It is rare for tort compensation to be obtained on behalf of injured children, the 
proportion of injuries where tort payments are made being only 1 per cent. This 
small proportion is partly due to a high proportion of cases where the injury is 
not anyone else’s fault, and partly due to the difficulty a child may have in giv-
ing a coherent account of an accident on which a claim could be based.28 
Men therefore have more accidents which result in the possibility of a tortious 
action than either women or children. The only comprehensive published 
study on this point — as to the features of accidents which result in negligence 
actions — is a now 30-year-old United Kingdom study which confirms that 
personal injury litigation is largely driven by accident type. This was a  
long-term and wide-ranging national study undertaken in 1984 by Harris et 
 
 25 Kreisfeld and Harrison, above n 15, iv. 
 26 Ibid 28. 
 27 Courts have been reluctant to hold that parents owe general duties of care to children: see 
Hahn v Conley (1971) 126 CLR 276; Robertson v Swincer (1989) 52 SASR 356. 
 28 United Kingdom, Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal 
Injury, Report (1978) vol 2, 70 [254] (‘Pearson Report’). 
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al.29 It compared the experience of those disabled through accidents of all 
categories and those disabled through illness. The study found that the 
accident victims who received legal damages had access to advice about 
claiming compensation which they often received unsolicited.30 It was found 
that road and work accident victims were ‘more likely to be involved in formal 
or semi-formal procedures for reporting the accidents’31 and therefore were 
more likely to receive legal advice.32 The study concluded that the 
characteristics of those people who succeeded in obtaining some damages for 
their injuries through the tort system, however, by no means reflect the charac-
teristics of those suffering accidents. The single most important factor associat-
ed with a successful claim for damages was the type of accident suffered. While 
fewer than one in three of road accident victims, and one in five of work acci-
dent victims obtained some damages, fewer than one in fifty of the victims of 
all other types of accident obtained any damages, despite the fact that this rep-
resented by far the largest category of accidents suffered.33  
While this study has not been replicated in Australia, some findings have 
support in local studies. For example, Harris et al observed that 
victims under the age of 16 and over the age of 65 rarely made claims for dam-
ages. Despite the fact that these age-groups together represented about one-
third of the total sample of accident victims, they comprised only 11 per cent of 
successful claimants.34  
This finding is mirrored in the most recent 2012 ‘Legal Australia-Wide 
Survey: Legal Need in Australia’ study (‘LAW Survey’) which found that 
across most Australian jurisdictions ‘the two youngest and the oldest age 
groups tended to have the lowest percentages for taking action, while the 
middle age groups tended to have the highest’.35 Harris et al found that of the 
almost 90 per cent of all United Kingdom accident victims who were not 
compensated for their injuries, ‘the vast majority’ had not accessed legal 
 
 29 Donald Harris et al, Compensation and Support for Illness and Injury (Clarendon Press, 1984). 
 30 Ibid 76. 
 31 Ibid. 
 32 Ibid 66–7, 76. 
 33 Ibid 50–1 (citations omitted). 
 34 Ibid 52. 
 35 Christine Coumarelos et al, ‘Legal Australia-Wide Survey: Legal Need in Australia’ (Access to 
Justice and Legal Needs vol 7, Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales, August 2012) 
189. 
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services.36 Similarly, the LAW Survey, while not focusing upon personal 
injury, determined that in this country there is no ‘rush to law’, with less than 
10 per cent of legal problems across Australia being finalised by formal courts 
or tribunals.37  
III   ( I N)JU S T IC E  A N D  T H E  LAW  O F  N E G L IG E N C E:  LI T IG AT I O N   
As Part II identifies, existing evidence indicates that men suffer injuries which 
are actionable in negligence more often than those which befall women and 
children. This Part shows that it is not known whether women and children 
are also less likely to litigate for their negligently inflicted injuries than men. 
Of course, internationally, the barriers to groups other than men partici-
pating in litigation have been recognised. In relation to women, Catherine 
Branson, then President of the Australian Human Rights Commission, 
observed in 2011 that 
[n]onetheless, women as litigants continue to face many barriers in accessing 
justice; these include their lack of knowledge of their rights, their reduced eco-
nomic capacity, and their dependence on male relatives for resources, not to 
mention the stigma that can attach to women if they seek or threaten legal re-
course.38 
This comment is supported by international and Australian tort law scholar-
ship which evidences a lack of gender neutrality in both the substantive and 
procedural aspects of tort law.39 For example, authors such as Chamallas and 
Wriggins have suggested that the discriminatory operation of tort law is 
 
 36 Harris et al, above n 29, 65. 
 37 Coumarelos et al, above n 35, 39. 
 38 Catherine Branson, ‘“Women as Agents of Change”: Balancing the Scales’ (Speech delivered 
at the Commonwealth Law Ministers’ Meeting, New South Wales Government House,  
Sydney, 13 July 2011) <https://www.humanrights.gov.au/news/speeches/president-speech-
women-agents-change-balancing-scales>, citing Laura Turquet et al, ‘2011–2012 Progress of 
the World’s Women: In Pursuit of Justice’ (Report, United Nations Entity for Gender Equality 
and the Empowerment of Women, 2011) 52–5. 
 39 Leslie Bender, ‘A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort’ (1988) 38 Journal of Legal 
Education 3, 20–5, 30–7; Joanne Conaghan, ‘Law, Harm and Redress: A Feminist Perspective’ 
(2002) 22 Legal Studies 319, 333–8; Wendy Parker, ‘The Reasonable Person: A Gendered 
Concept?’ (1993) 23 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 105; Thomas Koenig and 
Michael Rustad, ‘His and Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice in Disguise’ (1995) 70 Washing-
ton Law Review 1. See generally Lucinda M Finley, ‘A Break in the Silence: Including Women’s 
Issues in a Torts Course’ (1989) 1 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 41; Graycar and Morgan, 
The Hidden Gender of Law (2nd ed), above n 3. 
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fundamentally due to the construction of tort around fault-based physical and 
economic harm rather than emotional and non-economic harm.40 Further 
scholarship suggests that law which appears neutral41 may, due to gender 
inequalities which exist in wider society, be unequal in application.42 For 
example, Smart argues that women who go to law are characterised by their 
relationships as ‘mothers, wives, sexual objects, pregnant women, deserted 
mothers, single mothers and so on. They are not simply women (as distinct 
from men), and they are most definitely not ungendered persons’.43 Other 
scholars have suggested that women’s lack of visibility in litigation is because 
many women litigants must bring their children to court, being ‘further 
burdened by the lack of day care facilities and flexibility in court schedules’.44 
Such observations as to structural obstacles of tortious litigation have simi-
larly been observed in relation to children. In Australia, generally a child will 
not have lost earnings and will be able to access free medical care. The same 
general legal principles are used to assess damages to compensate injured 
children as for adults. One difficulty for children is therefore that the claim 
will be more speculative. In 1987, the Ontario Law Reform Commission 
stated that 
[i]n the case of younger children, who have not yet formulated a career plan, 
the courts look at any evidence as to the child’s capabilities. Degree of success in 
school is important in this regard. The most difficult cases are those of very 
young children who have not yet displayed any particular aptitude. There seems 
to be no doubt that many such plaintiffs are undercompensated. In some cases, 
no award was made at all under this head. … The result of the current approach 
 
 40 Martha Chamallas and Jennifer B Wriggins, The Measure of Injury: Race, Gender and Tort 
Law (New York University Press, 2010) 2. 
 41 See Robin West, Caring for Justice (New York University Press, 1997) 29. 
 42 See generally Graycar and Morgan, The Hidden Gender of Law (2nd ed), above n 3. 
 43 Carol Smart, ‘Law’s Truth/Women’s Experience’ in Regina Graycar (ed), Dissenting Opinions: 
Feminist Explorations in Law and Society (Allen & Unwin, 1990) 1, 7, quoted in Regina 
Graycar and Jenny Morgan, The Hidden Gender of Law (Federation Press, 1st ed, 1990) 176. 
 44 ‘Gender Bias Study of the Court System in Massachusetts’ (1990) 24 New England Law Review 
745, 758. In an Australian context, the necessity for women to take their children to court has 
some support from ABS data, which confirms that while the amount of time men spend on 
caring for children and household work has increased over the years, women are still doing 
the majority of household and caring work: ABS, How Australians Use Their Time, 2006 (ABS 
Catalogue No 4153.0, 21 February 2008). In 2009, 16.3 per cent of all employed men had 
made a request for flexible working arrangements to help with caring responsibilities, com-
pared with 29.1 per cent of women: Barbara Pocock, Natalie Skinner and Reina Ichii, ‘Work, 
Life and Workplace Flexibility: The Australian Work and Life Index 2009’ (Report, Centre for 
Work + Life, University of South Australia, July 2009) 4. 
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is that infant plaintiffs generally receive much lower awards for loss of earning 
capacity than most adult plaintiffs.45 
Consequently, parents or guardians may see no use in claiming unless the 
injuries are catastrophic and ongoing. Even where a claim is made, an injured 
child may have any damages which are awarded reduced for contributory 
negligence46 and a defendant will completely avoid liability if it is held that the 
child was entirely responsible for his or her own loss.47 
The obstacles which apply in any litigation are compounded for a child 
plaintiff. It is recognised that ‘children and young people are a largely disen-
franchised group, and among the least “rights-conscious” members of 
society’.48 Schetzer and Henderson list the barriers facing the child litigant as 
including: 
 lack of specialist legal services for young people •
 lack of awareness of rights and legal entitlements •
 reliance on adults to mediate their access to legal services •
 fear of being disbelieved or not taken seriously by service providers •
 most solicitors lack skills in dealing with children and young people •
 intimidating and formal atmosphere of many legal services •
 lack of information strategies which specifically target children and young peo-•
ple.49 
Further, as would be the case in many personal injury claims, children with 
disabilities ‘often have to work through a carer to obtain legal advice. In some 
circumstances the interests of the carer and those of the young person are not 
 
 45 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Compensation for Personal Injuries and Death 
(1987) 42 (citations omitted). 
 46 See McHale v Watson (1966) 115 CLR 199; Kelly v Bega Valley County Council (Unreported, 
New South Wales Court of Appeal, Hope, Glass and Samuels JJA, 13 September 1982); Com-
monwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258; Gunning v Fellows (1997) 25 MVR 97; Ryan v 
State Rail Authority of New South Wales [1999] NSWSC 1236 (16 December 1999);  
Sainsbury v Great Southern Energy Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 479 (26 May 2000); Traynor v 
Australian Capital Territory [2007] ACTSC 38 (18 June 2007). 
 47 See, eg, Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 
Romeo v Conservation Commission of the Northern Territory (1998) 192 CLR 431. 
 48 Louis Schetzer and Judith Henderson, ‘Access to Justice and Legal Needs: A Project to 
Identify Legal Needs, Pathways and Barriers for Disadvantaged People in NSW — Stage 1: 
Public Consultations’ (Report, Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales, August 
2003) 67 [2.105]. 
 49 Ibid xvii–xviii. 
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the same’.50 In terms of the court process, children, characterised as being of 
legal incapacity, may not carry on or even commence a legal proceeding 
except by way of a tutor. If carers too readily accept that an injury suffered by 
a child is the result of the child’s own carelessness, this may also result in no 
legal action being pursued. 
However, as noted at the outset to this Part, there is an absence of empiri-
cal evidence to confirm that the Australian system of litigation is biased as to 
either gender or age. Australian data as to the characteristics or motivations of 
litigants in civil cases are sparse.51 A 1985 study by Cranston et al into the 
Supreme Courts of New South Wales, Victoria and the Australian Capital 
Territory notes that personal injury cases occupy a substantial part of the 
administrative and judicial resources of those courts.52 Interestingly, 
Cranston et al observed that ‘[a]lthough personal injury cases comprise a 
relatively small proportion of matters commenced, they comprise a substan-
tial number of the cases entering lists and getting as far as a trial’.53 The same 
study established that 
[c]ompared with the number of matters commenced in the Supreme Courts [of 
New South Wales, Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory], the number of 
appeals is extremely small. … [L]ess than one in a hundred of the cases com-
menced in the courts go on appeal.54 
Appeals to the High Court are considerably rarer than those in the Supreme 
Courts. Importantly, an appeal to the High Court is not as of right as the 
Court has discretionary jurisdiction to grant special leave to appeal and thus 
controls which matters it hears. Section 35A of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) 
does not make the characteristics of the litigant a determinative issue as to 
whether a case is selected for hearing: 
In considering whether to grant an application for special leave to appeal to the 
High Court under this Act or under any other Act, the High Court may have 
regard to any matters that it considers relevant but shall have regard to: 
 
 50 Ibid 71 [2.113]. 
 51 It is difficult to obtain court data as to litigants’ gender except in criminal matters: see, eg, 
ABS, Criminal Courts, Australia, 2012–13 (ABS Catalogue No 4513.0, 27 March 2014). 
 52 Ross Cranston et al, ‘Delays and Efficiency in Civil Litigation’ (Report, Australian Institute of 
Judicial Administration, June 1985) 126 [12.1]. 
 53 Ibid 126 [12.2] 
 54 Ibid 155 [15.1]. 
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(a) whether the proceedings in which the judgment to which the applica-
tion relates was pronounced involve a question of law: 
(i) that is of public importance, whether because of its general 
application or otherwise; or 
(ii) in respect of which a decision of the High Court, as the final 
appellate court, is required to resolve differences of opinion 
between different courts, or within the one court, as to the 
state of the law; and 
(b) whether the interests of the administration of justice, either generally 
or in the particular case, require consideration by the High Court of 
the judgment to which the application relates. 
After 10 years on the High Court, Justice Kirby observed: 
I will not pretend that the process of judging special leave applications is wholly 
logical or scientific. An inescapable element of intuition, wrapped in experi-
ence, within an exercise of judgment produces the outcomes. As lawyers and 
judges, we may strive to minimise the human elements, with their risks of per-
sonal attitudes and values. Yet we deceive ourselves if we think that we can 
eliminate them altogether from the equation.55 
Despite this acknowledgment of the personal element in choice making, his 
Honour acknowledged that certain issues tend to favour a grant of special 
leave, but gender and age did not appear as relevant factors in this discus-
sion.56 It has never been determined whether the special leave process itself is 
biased as to gender or age.57 
It is unfortunate that little Australian legal scholarship exists as to why 
litigants proceed with civil cases and even less on the impact of factors such as 
gender and age on any such decision. In one of the only Australian studies in 
this area, Delaney and Wright investigated plaintiffs’ experience of the fairness 
of the New South Wales court system.58 The study interviewed 255 plaintiffs 
whose personal injury claims were resolved at trial, arbitration, pre-trial 
conference or private mediation. Fifty-six per cent of participants were 
 
 55 Justice Michael Kirby, ‘Maximising Special Leave Performance in the High Court of Australia’ 
(2007) 30 University of New South Wales Law Journal 731, 731. 
 56 Ibid 743–7. 
 57 An empirical examination of who brings special leave applications and the success or 
failure rates upon special leave is needed and is beyond the current study. 
 58 Marie Delaney and Ted Wright, Plaintiffs’ Satisfaction with Dispute Resolution Processes: Trial, 
Arbitration, Pre-Trial Conference and Mediation (Law Foundation of New South Wales, 1997). 
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women and forty-four per cent were men.59 However, the limited nature of 
the demographic in this study means there is a limited extent to which we can 
use these figures to generalise as to whether there is a greater representation of 
male plaintiffs in claims resolved in the lower courts in New South Wales. 
Children provide focus for research and scholarship in areas such as family 
law and criminal law (that is, children as victims of sexual assault or as part of 
family law proceedings). Personal injury and negligence claims by children 
are one area that requires further research.60 Two basic assumptions behind 
this lack of investigation may be: firstly, that legal scholars generally accept 
that people litigate and appeal because they are ‘interested only in winning’;61 
and secondly, that traditional and alternative dispute resolution procedures 
assume that law and legal institutions ‘should be blind to the personal 
characteristics of those who come before the courts’.62  
One significant exception to the lack of empirical research on legal needs is 
the recent Australian study into who takes legal action or seeks legal advice as 
a result of legal problems. Based upon over 20 000 telephone interviews, the 
LAW Survey found that age is relevant to legal problems such that 
different ages or life stages were associated with different types of legal prob-
lems. In most jurisdictions, accidents, crime, personal injury and rights prob-
lems peaked between 15 and 24 years of age, and credit/debt and family prob-
lems peaked between 25 and 44 years of age.63  
The report also considered gender, stating that 
[r]egression analyses have not typically revealed a link between gender and 
overall prevalence of legal problems. Occasionally, however, regression analyses 
have produced gender differences on some types of legal problems. For exam-
 
 59 Ibid 16 [32]. 
 60 Australian commentators have called for further research into children’s views as to legal 
services: see Nicola M Ross, ‘Legal Representation of Children’ in Geoff Monahan and Lisa 
Young (eds), Children and the Law in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2008) 544, 572 
n 144. For a direct discussion of children in the High Court in the tort of negligence, see Pam 
Stewart and Geoff Monahan, ‘Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Dederer: 
Negligence and the Exuberance of Youth’ (2008) 32 Melbourne University Law Review 739. 
 61 Scott Barclay, An Appealing Act: Why People Appeal in Civil Cases (Northwestern University 
Press and the American Bar Foundation, 1999) 2. 
 62 E Allan Lind, Yuen J Huo and Tom R Tyler, ‘… And Justice for All: Ethnicity, Gender and 
Preferences for Dispute Resolution Procedures’ (1994) 18 Law and Human Behaviour 269, 
269. 
 63 Coumarelos et al, above n 35, xv; see generally at 168–73. 
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ple, the [New South Wales Legal Needs Survey] found higher rates of acci-
dent/injury problems for males.64  
This report thus reinforces the significance of the material discussed in Part II. 
However, it has limited application here due to its focus upon access to 
addressing legal needs rather than on personal injury, courts and litigation. 
Litigating in Australia it is both time-consuming65 and expensive. Any 
person who pursues an action in negligence will suffer all the stress and 
pressure of litigation. This is compounded by the nature and expense of 
litigation. These difficulties were recognised by the High Court in Waterways 
Authority v Fitzgibbon: 
the extreme and well-known difficulties which injured plaintiffs without assets 
have in mounting complex litigation against defendants who, without impro-
priety, are seeking to take every step the law affords them to preserve their posi-
tions. They may have to marshal lay witnesses not necessarily sympathetic to 
them. They may have to seek documents from the defendants, or from third 
parties who may not be amenable to that course. They may have to find expert 
witnesses and persuade solicitors to pay them. They may have to appeal to the 
charity of legal advisers prepared to fund litigation without any certainty that 
either the just fees of the unpaid advisers will ever be paid, or the other expend-
itures which have been made by those advisers will ever be reimbursed.66 
In Australia, cost is a significant barrier to obtaining legal advice and repre-
sentation.67 In particular, the cost of pursuing litigation to the High Court is a 
significant constraint. Moreover, in Australia, being a jurisdiction where costs 
 
 64 Ibid 17 (citations omitted). 
 65 As well as type of injury, duration of litigation is also an important barrier to compensation 
with ‘[t]he duration of claims from accident to finalisation rang[ing] from less than one year 
to 16 years, the median was six years’: Delaney and Wright, above n 58, 36 [66]. 
 66 (2005) 221 ALR 402, 413 [45] (Kirby and Heydon JJ). 
 67 Coumarelos et al, above n 35, 195. This is formally acknowledged by the legal system in that 
certain individuals will be exempt from payment of filing and hearing fees associated with 
proceedings in the High Court (for example, persons who hold a concession card issued by 
Centrelink or the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, inmates of prisons, children under the age 
of 18 and persons in receipt of study benefits): High Court of Australia, Annual Report  
2010–2011 (2011) 32. In 2010–11, the High Court waived $580 421 on fees, waiving payment 
of two-thirds of the fee in 218, or approximately 31 per cent, of cases: at 33. However, Legal 
Aid is not generally available for civil claims. For example, in New South Wales, Legal Aid is 
not available for matters involving personal injury, medical negligence or public liability: 
Legal Aid New South Wales, ‘Civil Law Policy — Family Provision Claims, Personal Injury, 
Medical Negligence and Others’ (Policy Bulletin No 6/12, 2012). 
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follow the event,68 the cost implications of losing play a key role in any 
decision to litigate. 
Much of the available empirical research undertaken with respect to liti-
gant motivations, age and gender is based in the United States.69 This research 
is of limited application in Australia, as United States costs considerations are 
not comparable to the Australian context. This is because of the United States 
position on contingency fees and also because, as noted earlier, in Australia 
costs generally follow the event (not the case in the United States). Barclay, in 
an early 1990s United States study, asked the question: why do individuals 
appeal in civil cases?70 From his study of 125 interviews with appellants, his 
conclusion was: ‘individuals are less interested in winning their cases than we 
have been traditionally led to believe. Instead, I posit that the litigants are 
motivated primarily by the desire to be treated fairly’.71 Barclay’s study 
observes a differentiation only with respect to women, noting that only 30 per 
cent of the 125 interviews were with women.72 Barclay stated that ‘the project 
specifically targeted women for interviews’ in ‘bias … designed to mediate the 
possibility that the project would be left with an insufficient sample of women 
litigants to make comparisons based on gender differences’.73 Barclay suggests 
that the factors which contribute to reduced numbers of female appellants 
may include systemic bias in terms of court procedure. Barclay posits that the 
issue of being treated fairly may be intimately connected with the personal 
characteristics of those who come before the court. Speaking of the United 
States court system, he notes that ‘women may not have high expectations of 
receiving justice in a court system that until recently sanctioned and upheld 
racist and sexist policies’.74  
In earlier United States research Lind and Tyler, in a study of 286 tort liti-
gants (at first instance), also found that the litigant’s original expectation of 
 
 68 The general rule that the losing party pays the winning party’s costs has been legislatively 
codified in some jurisdictions: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 42.1; Uniform 
Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 681; Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 263(1); Rules of 
the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) O 66 r 1. 
 69 For a comprehensive coverage of interdisciplinary scholarship, see Tamara Relis, ‘Civil 
Litigation from Litigants’ Perspectives: What We Know and What We Don’t Know about the 
Litigation Experience of Individual Litigants’ (2002) 25 Studies in Law, Politics and Society 
151. 
 70 Barclay, above n 61. 
 71 Ibid 3. 
 72 Ibid 32. 
 73 Ibid. 
 74 Ibid 82. 
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fairness was dependent upon perceptions of outcomes.75 The study by Lind 
and Tyler describes how procedural justice may be ‘explained by a social 
psychology of informed self-interest’,76 and observes that this reason alone is 
not sufficient to explain the psychology of procedural justice: ‘the traditional 
assumption that people are continually and centrally concerned with maxim-
izing their outcomes must inevitably lead to a model that fails to capture the 
unique qualities associated with justice’.77 
Similarly, other studies have found aspects other than age and gender to be 
important motivators for litigation, extending to taking action even when the 
litigant’s case is not legally valid but the action is motivated by a moral claim 
to the remedy being pursued.78 Other possible motivations put forward are 
less noble, such as revenge: that people suffering negligent injury from 
another party often want to punish that party through financial penalties with 
the aim of ‘making them pay’.79 Some aims are unknowable, with research by 
Relis finding that in torts cases, litigants ‘frequently have important hidden 
agendas and unrevealed aims, which may be their cardinal goals’.80 Generally, 
the existing empirical research into the motivation of litigants supports the 
broad assertion that the objectives of litigants are ‘diverse and complex. 
Moreover, as litigants’ perceptions of their needs change throughout litigation, 
so too may their goals [if they have any]’.81 
Some of these United States studies have noted gender as a factor in deci-
sions to litigate. A now dated 40-year-old United States study revealed that ‘of 
166 seriously injured male accident victims, 38 percent filed suit; whereas of 
178 seriously injured female accident victims, only 30 percent filed suit’.82 
Nagel and Weitzman posit that the reason for the differences in filing suit 
between men and women might be due: 
 
 75 E Allan Lind and Tom R Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (Plenum Press, 
1988). 
 76 Ibid 226. 
 77 Ibid 230. 
 78 Relis, above n 69, 154. 
 79 This refers to the payment of damages by the party that caused the negligence being 
punishment. However, it has been said that this is no longer effective due to insurance: 
Productivity Commission, above n 11, 830. 
 80 Relis, above n 69, 156. 
 81 Ibid 155 (citations omitted). 
 82 Stuart S Nagel and Lenore J Weitzman, ‘Women as Litigants’ (1971) 23 Hastings Law Journal 
171, 184, citing Alfred F Conard et al, Automobile Accident Costs and Payments: Studies in the 
Economics of Injury Reparation (University of Michigan Press, 1964) 259. 
2014] Lacunae and Litigants 169 
(1) to a possibly higher rate of precomplaint settlements where females are in-
volved or (2) to a possible tendency of females to suffer slighter injuries than 
males. Perhaps a more meaningful explanation is that women are encouraged 
to be less aggressive in asserting their legal rights in personal injury cases …83 
This view has been reflected in an Australian context, where Graycar writes 
that women are ‘less likely to contemplate the possibility of a legal remedy for 
their injuries, less likely to seek legal advice when they have a potentially 
compensable claim and less likely to recover damages for their injuries’.84  
IV  S T U DY  OU T C O M E S  A N D  M E T H O D O L O G Y   
Given the background evidence discussed in Parts II and III it may not be 
surprising that this study, which analyses all negligence actions before the 
High Court from 2000–10, confirms that adult males are involved in more 
High Court negligence actions than women and children combined. This 
conclusion is drawn from plaintiffs in the High Court, whether they are 
appellants or respondents. It examines the numbers of plaintiffs and not the 
separate question of who appeals to the High Court of Australia. This article 
does not, however, draw a link between the material discussed in Parts II 
and III and the results of this study. Indeed, the data set discussed in this Part 
is restricted to High Court appeals during a limited time period and is thus a 
small and unrepresentative sample of people who pursue remedies for 
personal injury. There is no necessary correlation between the cases that end 
up in the High Court and the incidence of injuries, or even between those 
cases in which litigation is commenced and the incidence of injuries. Current-
ly there is no way of determining how the age and gender distribution of 
plaintiffs in High Court negligence appeals compares with the gender 
distribution of people who initiate litigation. This becomes even more difficult 
to determine given that the vast majority of cases commenced are settled, with 
those that go to the High Court being a tiny fraction of possible negligence 
actions. 
Further, as noted in Part III, there is an absence of Australian empirical 
studies on the motivation of High Court litigants to appeal in negligence 
actions. Much care is therefore taken in this Part in making related claims as a 
result of the data presented. As the mainly United States scholarship identified 
in the preceding Part observes, the choice to litigate — whether at first 
 
 83 Nagel and Weitzman, above n 82, 184. 
 84 Graycar, ‘Teaching Torts as if the World Really Existed’, above n 18, 684. 
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instance or on appeal — is motivated by complex considerations that may be 
unrelated to the personal characteristics of the plaintiff, such as gender and 
age. 
The analysis below is based upon a database constructed with the assis-
tance of research assistants through reading all High Court negligence 
decisions over an 11-year period from 1 January 2000. Generally cases were 
excluded from the research where substantive legal issues pertaining to the 
law of negligence were not the subject of the appeal.85 In all, 78 negligence 
cases were examined and coded for the purposes of the research. However, the 
5 cases where the damage was purely economic are excluded from examina-
tion in this article, which examines personal injury.86 
Thus, the complete data set was of 78 cases in which judgments were deliv-
ered by the High Court between 1 January 2000 and 31 December 2010 where 
negligence was a cause of action. From the total 78 cases, the data set identi-
fies 73 High Court decisions which involve negligence actions concerning 
personal injury. These 73 personal injury negligence cases involved a total of 
88 individual plaintiffs. 
Importantly, these figures represent total numbers of plaintiffs. This means 
that in cases with multiple plaintiffs, each plaintiff was counted individually. 
For example, in a case such as Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v 
Anzil 87 where there were multiple plaintiffs (one female and one male), each 
plaintiff is counted separately. Thus, the variables were counted as separate 
instances of appearances of men, women and children.88 This was done as the 
aim of the data analysis was not to distinguish whether gender or age were 
factors in the Court arriving at a decision, but rather to identify the character-
istics of the individual litigants. Thus, multiple litigants are counted separately 
 
 85 So for example, decisions were excluded where, although the case was based on a claim in 
negligence, the High Court judgment was solely concerned with matters such as a statute of 
limitations: see Queensland v Stephenson (2006) 226 CLR 197; Davison v Queensland (2006) 
226 CLR 324; Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (2006) 226 CLR 
256; Blunden v Commonwealth (2003) 218 CLR 330; Russo v Aiello (2003) 215 CLR 643; 
Commonwealth v Cornwell (2007) 229 CLR 519. As to the gendered impact of limitation 
periods in tort law, see Joanne Conaghan, ‘Tort Litigation in the Context of Intra-Familial 
Abuse’ (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 132, 140–4. 
 86 See Travel Compensation Fund v Tambree (2005) 224 CLR 627; Woolcock Street Investments 
Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins (2003) 215 CLR 317; 
Baxter v Obacelo Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 635; Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1. 
 87 (2000) 205 CLR 254. 
 88 Note here that in the case of Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, the 
male plaintiff is counted in each of the three separate actions. This is indicated in the Appen-
dix. 
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for the data analysis of age and gender which appears in the following graphs. 
The Appendix identifies the number and gender of the plaintiffs in each case. 
Adjustments were made in actions taken by dependants following the 
death of an individual through the alleged negligence of the defendant. These 
actions are taken under legislation (for example, s 4 of the Compensation to 
Relatives Act 1987 (NSW)). Here the gender of the adult plaintiff (the person 
holding the legal cause of action) is counted. Consequently, the gender of the 
deceased (the actual person injured) is not included and neither are depend-
ent children. This is relevant in four cases. First, in the High Court decision of 
Sydney Water Corporation v Turano (‘Turano’),89 the gender of the adult 
female is counted and her two dependent children are not included.90 Second, 
in Amaca Pty Ltd v Ellis (‘Amaca’),91 the adult female executor who brought 
the action under the Fatal Accidents Act 1959 (WA) is counted but her four 
daughters (aged 5–16) are not.92 Third, in CAL No 14 Pty Ltd v Motor Acci-
dents Insurance Board (‘CAL No 14’)93 the female plaintiff who brought the 
action under the Fatal Accidents Act 1934 (Tas) is counted, rather than the 
male plaintiff who died in the motor accident. Fourth, in Stuart v  
Kirkland-Veenstra (‘Stuart’)94 Mrs Kirkland-Veenstra brought the claim on 
behalf of her deceased husband. These cases are noted in the Appendix. 
There were various cases which were heard together, and where the High 
Court delivered judgments in separate matters simultaneously which were 
reported together. In some instances it was difficult to decide whether these 
kinds of cases should be recorded as one case, with the different plaintiffs 
counted separately, or as separate cases. The Appendix demonstrates how all 
the cases in our research were counted. 
In some instances, there were cases heard together with different plaintiffs 
where the defendant, the event giving rise to each claim, the evidence, the 
legal issues and the outcome were the same. These were counted as one case 
with separate plaintiffs (for example, Wicks v State Rail Authority of New 
 
 89 (2009) 239 CLR 51. Note here that the gender of the children represented in Turano are 
ignored for the purpose of data collection, as the gender or identifying features of the chil-
dren were not made obvious by any superior court. The result for our data is to exclude 
Turano from the gender discussion as to children. 
 90 Identified as ‘Christopher’ and ‘Sophia’ in the Commonwealth Law Reports headnote. Thank 
you to the Editors of this journal for that point. 
 91 (2010) 240 CLR 111. 
 92 See also the first instance judgment: Ellis v South Australia [2006] WASC 270 (8 December 
2006). 
 93 (2009) 239 CLR 390. 
 94 (2009) 237 CLR 215. 
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South Wales; Sheehan v State Rail Authority of New South Wales95 and Adeels 
Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak; Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Bou Najem96). 
In other instances there were multiple cases heard together where the cases 
had the same outcome and involved identical considerations of law, even 
though the cases involved different parties and events. These cases were also 
counted as one case with several separate plaintiffs (for example, Agar v Hyde; 
Agar v Worsley 97 and Sullivan v Moody; Thompson v Connan98). Where, 
however, cases involved different parties, events and evidence, and the 
outcomes were different, they were counted as separate cases (for example, 
Tame v New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd 99 and Brodie v 
Singleton Shire Council; Ghantous v Hawkesbury City Council 100). 
Generally, in cases where there was a single plaintiff but multiple defend-
ants, we counted the case as one case with one plaintiff, on the basis that the 
plaintiff ’s claim was against concurrent tortfeasors. The decision in Graham 
Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (‘Graham Barclay Oysters’),101 however, 
presented some difficulties in counting. The three appeals heard together 
(where Ryan was the plaintiff) were counted separately because there were 
significant differences between the claims made against New South Wales and 
the Great Lakes Shire Council, on the one hand, and those made against the 
Barclay companies, on the other. The plaintiff was ultimately unsuccessful in 
each case, but for very different reasons, so we counted them separately. 
Our approach to counting the cases is deliberately plaintiff-focused. There 
are different approaches to counting cases before the High Court. We have not 
been able to locate a uniform methodology in this area. Here we also note that 
other legal authors who have engaged in this style of systematic study have not 
listed the cases they have included. 
Graph 1 depicts a simple representation of the breakdown of females and 
males involved as plaintiffs in personal injury negligence litigation in the High 
Court from 2000–10. As Graph 1 shows, of the total raw number of 88 
plaintiffs, 36 were female and 52 were male. 
 
 95 (2010) 241 CLR 60. 
 96 (2009) 239 CLR 420. 
 97 (2000) 201 CLR 552. 
 98 (2001) 207 CLR 562. 
 99 (2002) 211 CLR 317. 
 100 (2001) 206 CLR 512. 
 101 (2002) 211 CLR 540. 
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Graph 1: Gender of Injured Party (Excludes Entities) 
This evidences lower numeric proportions of female plaintiffs as compared to 
males. It confirms fewer females appeared as plaintiffs (whether as appellant 
or respondent) before the High Court as opposed to all males in personal 
injury negligence litigation. 
When children102 (10 female and 5 male) are isolated from these figures, 
the breakdown between adult women, adult men, and children as a propor-
tion of all 88 individuals injured in the 11 years of decisions analysed, is as 
follows: 
Graph 2: Characteristic of Injured Party (Excludes Entities) 
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Graph 2 shows that adult men outnumber both women and children in High 
Court appeals. Of the 73 High Court decisions, 15 of the 88, or just over 17 
per cent, of all plaintiffs before the High Court were children. Thus, a signifi-
cantly lower proportion of litigants are under the age of 18 than those over 18. 
There is a discrepancy, with more adult males being represented as plaintiffs 
in the High Court than any other group. However, when it comes to children, 
overwhelmingly girls appear more often than boys. The reasons for this 
disparity between the genders of child litigants are not clear. 
Generally women do not appear as plaintiffs in High Court cases as fre-
quently as men, and children do not appear in the same numbers as adults. 
These facts alone do not indicate that the operation of the law of negligence is 
biased towards a certain group. Indeed, while the advantage of statistics is to 
provide a general scheme or pattern of conduct, the data, in taking a systemic 
view, inherently fail to explain why a lower proportion of women and children 
are plaintiffs in negligence cases appealed to the High Court. 
Graph 3 below provides a breakdown of the 88 individual plaintiffs in 
terms of category of case, by reference to the type of accident in which the 
plaintiff was involved or the type of defendant responsible for the plaintiff ’s 
injury. Categorisation of cases in this way is at times complex — a case may sit 
comfortably in more than one category. For example, the plaintiff in Fox v 
Percy, who was injured by a motor car while riding a horse,103 could have their 
injury categorised as both a transport accident and a recreational activity. 
Also, some cases do not fit comfortably in any of the nine categories allocated. 
In such instances the coding is discretionary and such cases are coded 
according to the activity during which, or location where, the plaintiff 
sustained his or her injury, rather than the legal issue. For example, the legal 
issue in Scott v Davis was whether the owners of a recreational plane could be 
held vicariously liable for the deceased pilot’s negligent flying of that plane,104 
but for the purposes of analysis the case has been coded under recreational 
activity. It should be noted that the methodology for selecting one category in 
preference to another is based upon two central considerations. Firstly, to 
ascertain where the claims by men, women and children lie in terms of types 
of injuries commonly suffered by women and children and the places where 
those injuries occur. This is particularly relevant for the analysis of hospital 
admissions data. This means that the type and location of the injury were 
prioritised over the type of defendant (for example, the categorisation of 
 
 103 (2003) 214 CLR 118. 
 104 (2000) 204 CLR 333. 
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Pledge v Roads and Traffic Authority (‘Pledge’)105 as a transport case). Second-
ly, categories were chosen in recognition of the significant impact of the tort 
law reform legislation introduced across Australian jurisdictions from 2002. 
This means that the nature of the activity was coded as being more important 
than the type of defendant. For example, the category of ‘recreational activity’ 
results in decisions such as Vairy v Wyong Shire Council 106 and Mulligan v 
Coffs Harbour City Council 107 being classified as recreational activity cases 
rather than statutory authority cases. These methodological choices were 
made to further enhance the discussion of the gender and age of plaintiffs 
rather than the nature of the defendants. Due to this discretionary categorisa-
tion of cases, the category allocated to each case is identified in the Appendix. 
Graph 3: Categories of Cases and Total Plaintiff Numbers 
Graph 3 shows that in the period of this study, 50 per cent of all 88 plaintiffs 
in the High Court on appeal for personal injury claims were injured in the 
three categories of workplace accidents, recreational activity and motor 
accidents. Once claims against public authorities are added, the rate is just 
over two-thirds, or 67 per cent. Graph 3 shows that the most common form of 
injury claimed for was transport accidents (where the total number was 17). 
As was discussed in Part II, the prevalence of claims involving public authori-
ties, employment and recreational activities may very well be related to the 
 
 105 (2004) 205 ALR 56. 
 106 (2005) 223 CLR 422. 
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location of the injury, and may also demonstrate the significance of initiating 
actions against a defendant with the capacity to pay through insurance. 
In Graph 4, the gender and age of plaintiffs are mapped against the catego-
ry of case. This reveals that the features as to who is represented in the High 
Court in negligence claims is not dissimilar to the observations as to hospital 
data outlined in Part II. Graph 4 shows the breakdown of the 88 plaintiffs in 
terms of age and gender across the selected case categories of the 73 cases 
analysed. 
Graph 4: Categories of Cases and Characteristics of Plaintiffs 
Of all negligence appeals to the High Court between 2000–10, two women 
and one female child were injured in recreational activities.108 This contrasts 
with the higher numbers of nine men and two male children being injured 
through recreation. Thus, 21 per cent of all male plaintiffs in the 73 cases 
analysed were injured in recreational activities as opposed to 8 per cent of 
females. As previously noted, this supports the analysis of hospital data in 
Part II, as it is likely a reflection of the fact that most (77 per cent) sports-
 
 108 Note this depends upon case categorisation. Included in this count are the woman and female 
child in Frost v Warner (2002) 209 CLR 509 and the woman in Scott v Davis. This count 
excludes possible recreational injuries such as the use of the flying fox in Roman Catholic 
Church Trustees for the Diocese of Canberra and Goulburn v Hadba (2005) 221 CLR 161, 
which is counted as a public authority case, and the injury suffered by the female struck by a 
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related injury hospitalisations are of males.109 Further, in the two cases 
involving the three female plaintiffs, each female constituted part of a group 
containing an adult male who claimed for damages resulting from the same 
accident. In Frost v Warner there were three plaintiffs — a husband and wife, 
and their female child110 — and in Scott v Davis again there were three 
plaintiffs — a husband and wife, and their male child.111 It is also worth 
noting again that in the four cases of Amaca, CAL No 14, Turano and Stuart, 
the actions are counted as being brought by an adult female even though the 
person killed was male (categories of case being: one workplace, two 
transport, and one statutory authority). 
Graph 4 shows that the single category where women outnumber men is 
with respect to injury litigation involving negligence of an occupier. In this 
category of case, seven women were represented in appeals to the High Court 
as opposed to four men. Or, perhaps more markedly, from the nine cases 
classified as involving an occupier, seven involved claims by women.112 Only 
two cases involved claims by men alone.113 This is a puzzling difference. Based 
upon the scholarship on procedural justice based on the social psychology of 
justice discussed in Part III, it may be hypothesised that women may feel 
more entitled to bring an action against a party they believe has not kept 
premises in a safe manner.114 However, it seems a curious position to adopt, 
and perhaps a more logical answer is the more general one that any plaintiff is 
more prepared to litigate against a party who can pay — for example, an 
occupier such as a shopping centre, movie theatre, or club, with the benefit of 
public liability insurance. 
The data — as noted above — are limited and support a cautious approach 
with respect to over-generalising differences between men and women. For 
example, in this study eight men as opposed to five women were involved in 
High Court personal injury claims for work injuries. This is a ratio of nine per 
cent of men to seven per cent of women: not discernibly different.115 The 
 
 109 See Kreisfeld and Harrison, above n 15, 93. 
 110 (2002) 209 CLR 509. 
 111 (2000) 204 CLR 333. 
 112 Only one case involved two individuals where the woman was claiming loss of consortium: 
Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254. 
 113 Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak (2009) 239 CLR 420; Jones v Bartlett (2000) 205 CLR 166. 
 114 See Lind and Tyler, above n 75. 
 115 One partial explanation may be the construction of variables in the data set. For example, the 
decision in Thompson v Woolworths (Q’land) Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 234 (‘Thompson’) is one 
of occupiers’ liability. In this case, the female appellant conducted a bread delivery service, 
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similarity in the statistical proportion of High Court cases between men and 
women in these areas may support the finding that claims may be explained 
irrespective of gender by reference to the nature of the injury. 
Graph 4 also details children and the category of case in which their injury 
falls. Of course, in relation to cases involving children, it should be noted that 
in the vast majority of these cases, the plaintiffs are children in name only. The 
cases are usually directed and funded by adults, which negates issues such as 
the practical difficulty of children suing. 
Examining the 13 cases counted in the data set which involved child plain-
tiffs in High Court appeals, there was the following proportion of injuries: 
recreational or fall injuries (31 per cent);116 transport accidents (23 per 
cent);117 medical (23 per cent);118 vicarious liability for statutory authority for 
assault (15 per cent);119 and psychiatric injury caused by death of a parent (8 
per cent).120 Here, two obvious points of similarity emerge between these data 
and those of emergency admissions to hospital which were outlined in Part II. 
Firstly, the almost equivalent litigation rate for transport accidents (23 per 
cent of all appeals to the High Court, yet 21 per cent of hospital emergency 
admissions) and secondly, the litigation rates for falls (31 per cent of all 
appeals to the High Court and 40 per cent of injuries). 
However, this similarity should not be overstated. There is difficulty draw-
ing links between High Court appeals and injuries, and indeed between High 
Court appeals and causes of action. As a very early international study into 
children and tort compensation, the 1978 report of the United Kingdom 
 
making daily deliveries to the respondent’s store via a loading dock and injured her back 
when attempting to move the bins in order to hasten delivery one morning. This injury, and 
one sustained two weeks earlier, aggravated a pre-existing degenerative condition. The appel-
lant commenced an action against Woolworths on the basis of occupiers’ liability. However, 
any hospital admission would be counted as a workplace accident. For the purposes of this 
particular point of data analysis in this article, Thompson has therefore been counted as a 
workplace injury. Elsewhere in the article it is included as an occupiers’ liability case. 
 116 Roman Catholic Church Trustees for the Diocese of Canberra and Goulburn v Hadba (2005) 
221 CLR 161; Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 
Scott v Davis (2000) 204 CLR 333; Frost v Warner (2002) 209 CLR 509. 
 117 Pledge (2004) 205 ALR 56; Fergusson v Latham (2008) 246 ALR 463; Derrick v Cheung (2001) 
181 ALR 301; Frost v Warner (2002) 209 CLR 509. 
 118 Harriton v Stephens (2006) 226 CLR 52; Waller v James (2006) 226 CLR 136; Tabet v Gett 
(2010) 240 CLR 537. 
 119 New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511, which was heard along with Samin v 
Queensland and Rich v Queensland. 
 120 Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 269. 
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Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury 
(‘Pearson Report’), observed: 
In theory, a child has the same opportunities of seeking tort compensation as 
does an adult … In practice, few children seek tort compensation. According to 
our survey about one per cent of children injured after birth, as compared with 
about seven per cent of injured adults, obtain any reparation or payment 
through tort.121 
There is a lack of Australian data as to whether the number of child personal 
injury cases before the High Court during the period of this study is out of 
step with personal injury litigation at large. This is particularly the case as the 
proportion of children in this study who are represented before the High 
Court simulates population data as at June 2006. At that time, ‘the median age 
of the Australian population was 37 years. One in five Australians (20%) were 
children aged under 15 years, and 13% were aged 65 years and over’.122  
Tentative conclusions may be drawn which are not based upon linking the 
data of the study to injury data in any formal way. For example, in the data set, 
a fall involving playground equipment constituted only 4 per cent of all fall 
injuries for any age group, however for children aged 0–14 years it was the 
most common cause of injury; in this age band, 59 per cent of child fall 
injuries were from playground climbing equipment.123 Generally, there will be 
third parties involved in the provision of playgrounds (schools and councils 
are the most obvious) yet only one case in our study involved injury on school 
or public playground equipment. Returning to the explanation in the Pearson 
Report, the most obvious explanation for this may be attribution of fault, as 
the low rate of personal injury appeals involving children may be due to a 
high proportion of cases where the injury is not anyone else’s fault. The 
disparity between litigation statistics and the high number of injuries occur-
ring on playground equipment through falls can be explained by the fact that 
these accidents are ‘blameless’ in the sense that there is no person at fault, at 
least in a legal sense. Of course, another explanation may be that High Court 
decisions are not related in any formal way, being unique cases selected for the 
development of legal doctrine. 
 
 121 Pearson Report, above n 28, vol 1, 313 [1494]. This was with respect to children under the age 
of 16 and those under 19 undergoing full time education: at 312 [1490]. 
 122 ABS, A Picture of the Nation: The Statistician’s Report on the 2006 Census (ABS Catalogue 
No 2070.0, 29 January 2009) 6. 
 123 Kreisfeld and Harrison, above n 15, 21. 
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The data confirm the lack of success of the child plaintiff before the High 
Court. Success was coded according to whether the plaintiff in the original 
proceedings was ultimately successful in the High Court (whether as appel-
lant or respondent) in obtaining or retaining a finding of liability or an award 
of damages against a defendant party to the original proceedings. Also 
included as plaintiffs’ successful outcomes were cases where the High Court 
decision was ‘neutral’ to the plaintiff ’s case, so that decisions which were not 
determinative of liability or quantum of damages were included as successful 
if the plaintiff ’s position was not adversely affected. These included cases 
which resolved an issue between defendants, a procedural issue or a revoca-
tion of special leave. Cases where the plaintiff lost on a procedural matter were 
therefore counted as unsuccessful.124 
Over the period of the study, when child plaintiffs were involved in appeals 
to the High Court they were successful in 2 cases out of a total of 13 High 
Court decisions brought by child plaintiffs (15 per cent of cases) in compari-
son to the adult litigants, who were successful in 24 out of a total of 60 cases 
brought by adult plaintiffs (40 per cent of cases). 
Of the 73 decisions in this study, 14 cases (approximately 19 per cent) 
involved children either as the single injured plaintiff or as one of several 
plaintiffs in a suit. Specifically, of the 14 cases before the High Court which 
dealt solely with child plaintiffs, 12 were decided in favour of the defendant. 
In all but two of these cases — Pledge and Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedor-
ing Pty Ltd (‘Gifford’)125 — the children were unsuccessful. Of the two 
successful child litigant cases, one was not concerned with the question of the 
child’s right to compensation as it resolved a dispute between defendants over 
contribution (Pledge) and the other concerned the application of statutory law 
concerning psychiatric harm, which in all likelihood would have succeeded 
for the defendant if it had been considered under the current tort law reform 
legislation (Gifford). Thus, ignoring Pledge, there was only one successful 
appeal where children received compensation. 
Graph 5 shows that this success rate contrasts with the absence of signifi-
cant statistical difference in terms of men and women plaintiffs winning on 
appeal. There were 88 plaintiffs overall and 15 children in total. 
 
 124 See, eg, Fergusson v Latham (2008) 246 ALR 463. 
 125 (2003) 214 CLR 269. 
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Graph 5: Success Rates and Litigant Types 
Graph 6 represents the proportion of successful plaintiffs overall: 67 per cent 
of the total number of 88 plaintiffs were unsuccessful in the High Court, and 
of successful plaintiffs children represented only 3 per cent, women 9 per cent 
and men 21 per cent. 
Graph 6: Success of Plaintiffs 
Referring back to Graph 2, it is clear that these success rates reflect the 
diminishing number of overall cases as between men, women and children. In 
other words, it is to be expected that fewer children than men will be success-
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less, only three per cent of successful plaintiffs reflects a dramatic loss rate by 
children as opposed to the proportions of women and men. 
The nature of the cases on appeal to the High Court concerning children 
may be more critical in the lack of success for children rather than other 
factors such as gender or age.126 Failed cases for children include the very 
contentious wrongful life cases (which count as two failures: Harriton v 
Stephens;127 Waller v James128), and the novel ‘loss of a chance’ in the causation 
case Tabet v Gett.129 It is likely here that the fact there were child plaintiffs was 
very much secondary to the highly controversial legal issues involved. This 
was also the case with the three cases involving sexual abuse, statutory 
authorities and difficult principles of negligence law.130 Of the other cases, it 
could be suggested that the failure of the child in Roads and Traffic Authority 
of New South Wales v Dederer131 was very predictable. It followed two cases 
where the High Court had denied recovery in swimming and diving cases to 
adults.132 It is arguable that the lack of success for the plaintiff in the three 
cases, which involved transport accidents (Fergusson v Latham133 and  
Derrick v Cheung134) and recreational activities (Roman Catholic Church 
Trustees for the Diocese of Canberra and Goulburn v Hadba),135 were similarly 
unsurprising. 
As Graph 6 identifies, success rates for plaintiffs overall are unequal. Of the 
73 negligence cases which involved personal injury, plaintiffs lost in 47 cases, 
or 64 per cent of cases. This means that in only 26 cases, or 36 per cent, a 
plaintiff was ultimately successful.136 These figures show a significant loss rate 
by plaintiffs: for every three personal injury negligence cases which went on 
appeal to the High Court, a plaintiff was successful in only one of them. 
 
 126 Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for this point. 
 127 (2006) 226 CLR 52. 
 128 (2006) 226 CLR 136. 
 129 (2010) 240 CLR 537. 
 130 New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511, which was heard along with Samin v 
Queensland and Rich v Queensland. The judgments for the cases were dealt with and reported 
together although they were cases which were separately appealed. 
 131 (2007) 234 CLR 330. 
 132 Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; Mulligan v Coffs Harbour City Council 
(2005) 223 CLR 486. 
 133 (2008) 246 ALR 463. 
 134 (2001) 181 ALR 301. 
 135 (2005) 221 CLR 161. 
 136 It must be noted here that the methodology counted ‘neutral’ cases as successful plaintiff 
actions: see above n 124 and accompanying text. 
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Interestingly, the appeal to the High Court in 42, or 58 per cent, of the 73 
personal injury cases was brought by the plaintiff and in 31 cases, or 42 per 
cent, by defendants. When the defendant appealed, the win rate was higher. 
Of the total 73 cases, the defendant was the appellant in 31 cases. Of those, the 
plaintiff respondent lost in 24 cases. In other words, the defendant succeeded 
in 77 per cent of defendant-instigated appeals and lost only 7 cases to a 
plaintiff respondent. When plaintiffs appealed, the win rate was only a little 
more evenly distributed. Plaintiffs were appellants in 42 of the 73 cases in our 
study and 25 appellant plaintiffs lost their appeals (just under two-thirds or 60 
per cent). Of the 42 plaintiff appellants, a total of 17 plaintiffs won their 
appeals, giving them a 40 per cent success rate. 
It is difficult to predict whether this rate of diminishing returns for plain-
tiffs on appeal will be the case in the future. It is an understatement here to 
observe that the introduction of the tort law reform legislation or civil liability 
laws in every Australian jurisdiction from 2002137 was not aimed at increasing 
plaintiff success. Australia-wide, smaller numbers of injured individuals are 
now commencing litigation as a result of the tort law reform legislation 
introduced following the Panel of Eminent Persons’ (‘Panel’) review of the law 
of negligence (‘Ipp Review’)138 from 2002.139  
Of the 78 cases analysed during the period of our study, there were only 3 
negligence cases which were governed by substantive tort reform legislation, 
being the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) in each case. These were: Adeels 
Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak;140 Wicks v State Rail Authority of New South 
Wales;141 and Turano.142 In terms of the focus of this article, only 1 of these 
cases, Turano, concerned a female plaintiff who was ultimately unsuccessful 
on appeal to the High Court. However, as Turano concerned a duty of care 
question, and was a case where the woman appealing was not herself injured 
 
 137 The relevant legislation in each jurisdiction is: Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (NSW); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT); Personal 
Injuries (Civil Claims) Act 2003 (NT); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld); Civil Liability Act 1936 
(SA); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA). 
 138 Ipp Report, above n 9. This was the second of two reports that the Panel produced and 
contains the recommendations for substantive reform of the tort of negligence. 
 139 Wright, above n 5. 
 140 (2009) 239 CLR 420. 
 141 (2010) 241 CLR 60. 
 142 Although the claim was subject to the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), the case was decided on 
the duty of care question, rather than any provision of the legislation. The High Court re-
ferred to s 43A but made the point that it was not relied upon: see Turano (2009) 239 CLR 51, 
64 [23] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ). 
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but rather was claiming under dependants legislation, it is not possible to 
make any claims with respect to the possible impact of the legislative reforms 
upon women. 
V  DI S C U S S IO N 
Even in the absence of a significant number of High Court cases interpreting 
the tort law reform legislation, it may be predicted that future negligence 
litigation is unlikely to favour women, children or men as plaintiffs. As Vines 
has written, these laws introduced throughout Australia were premised on an 
‘insurance crisis’,143 the concept being that the crisis was ‘caused by an ever-
increasing level of litigation, ever-increasing damages awards and an extreme-
ly litigious society composed of individuals who are not prepared to take 
responsibility for their own actions’.144 As Vines notes, ‘[t]he present Australi-
an tort reform process is based largely on a simple desire to cut costs and to 
ensure predictability for insurers. On its own this is not enough to create 
principled tort law or effective reform’.145 When the Bill which formed the 
basis of the tort law reform was introduced into the New South Wales 
Parliament in 2002 by the then Premier Bob Carr, it was described as ‘a 
triumph for commonsense’146 and ‘a proposal for the most important reform 
of the laws of negligence in 70 years’.147 However, since the introduction of 
this legislation, questions have arisen about exactly for whom the reforms 
were a triumph. Subsequent criticism directed at the reforms has been harsh, 
with the President of the Law Council of Australia observing that the tort law 
reform has diluted fair and just compensation for injured people and dimin-
ished responsibility for tortious conduct amongst wrongdoers.148 
 
 143 Prue Vines, ‘Tort Reform, Insurance and Responsibility’ (2002) 25 University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 842, 842. 
 144 Ibid 843. See also Peter Cane, ‘Reforming Tort Law in Australia: A Personal Perspective’ 
(2003) 27 Melbourne University Law Review 649. 
 145 Vines, ‘Tort Reform, Insurance and Responsibility’, above n 143, 843. 
 146 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 23 October 2002, Hansard, 
5764 (Bob Carr). 
 147 Ibid 5767 (Bob Carr). 
 148 John North, ‘Tort Law: What’s the Point?’ (Speech delivered at the Inaugural ACT Branch 
Conference of the Australian Lawyers Alliance, Australian Capital Territory, 24 June 2005). 
See generally E W Wright, ‘National Trends in Personal Injury Litigation: Before and after 
“Ipp”’ (Report, Law Council of Australia, 26 May 2006), which concludes that there could 
have been no empirical basis for the ‘increase’ in litigation rates that contributed to the tort 
law reforms. 
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Given that the triggers for the legislative reform across Australia were a 
perceived ‘crisis in insurance’149 and a series of judicial decisions in New 
South Wales which received media attention as ‘proof ’ that the tort of 
negligence in Australia favoured plaintiffs,150 was out of step with community 
understanding of personal responsibility and was in danger of creating an 
overzealous United States-style litigious system,151 it was unlikely that the 
legislative change would advantage any particular class of plaintiffs. Indeed 
the generic aim of reducing damages without any reference to ensuring 
substantive parity amongst injured plaintiffs is reflected in the opening 
statement of the terms of reference for the Ipp Review: 
The award of damages for personal injury has become unaffordable and unsus-
tainable as the principal source of compensation for those injured through the 
fault of another. It is desirable to examine a method for the reform of the com-
mon law with the objective of limiting liability and quantum of damages arising 
from personal injury and death.152 
The Panel was not tasked to investigate inequality in the award of damages for 
personal injury. Indeed, the narrow terms of reference for the Panel invited 
retention of the existing legal framework, and any existing inequality within 
it, rather than addressing socio-economic inequity as an outcome.153 Clearly 
the aim of the tort law reform was not to strive for fair and just compensation 
for plaintiffs generally or for individual classes of plaintiffs. Legislative reform 
focused upon ensuring that injured people were made personally responsible 
for their own careless conduct, rather than on considerations of fairness or the 
differential impact that universal legislative reform may have had upon 
particular groups of people. This was despite existing international research 
 
 149 See Cane, ‘Reforming Tort Law in Australia’, above n 144. 
 150 See, eg, ABC Local Radio, ‘The World Today’, Public Liability Costs Soar, 2 October 2002 (Jo 
Mazzochi) <http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/stories/s691337.htm>; Swain v Waverley 
Municipal Council (2005) 220 CLR 517. Public discourse has played a large part in the debate 
surrounding tort law reform: see Justice D A Ipp, ‘Policy and the Swing of the Negligence 
Pendulum’ (Speech delivered at the Government Risk Management Conference, Perth, 15 
September 2003), cited in Chief Justice Paul de Jersey, ‘A Review of the Civil Liability Act and 
Tort Reform in Queensland’ (Speech delivered at the Queensland Law Society Personal 
Injuries Conference, Queensland, 29 June 2007) 1. 
 151 Rob Davis, ‘The Tort Reform Crisis’ (2002) 25 University of New South Wales Law Journal 865. 
 152 Ipp Report, above n 9, ix. 
 153 For a comment on the gendered nature of law reform generally, see Reg Graycar and Jenny 
Morgan, ‘Law Reform: What’s in It for Women?’ (2005) 23 Windsor Yearbook of Access to 
Justice 393. 
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which identified that tort law reform undertaken in the United States discrim-
inated against certain classes of individuals, such as women.154 Further, it has 
been observed that ‘[w]omen have been victimized in the past by “neutral” 
reform legislation which ignored gender differences’.155 
Accordingly, the Review of the Law of Negligence: Final Report (‘Ipp Re-
port’) discusses identifiable groups of litigants such as women, children and 
people with disabilities in only limited instances. This is the case notwith-
standing that children and people with disabilities were specifically referred to 
in the context of reform to limitation periods in one of the five terms of 
reference of the Panel.156 In the 255-page report, children are referred to in 
three instances across four pages: firstly, when the Panel recommends 
limitation periods running against minors;157 secondly, when the need for 
adjustment of contributory negligence standards between children and adults 
is confirmed;158 and finally, when the recreational activity defence as it applies 
to children is adjusted for the ‘reasonable person in the position of the 
participant’, as ‘many participants in recreational activities are children, whom 
most people would think need and deserve special protection from risks of 
personal injury and death’.159 The reference to recreational activities is 
seemingly the single point in the report where disadvantage is noted, the 
Panel stating that: 
these [legislative provisions] should give ample room for the law to develop 
flexibly to provide protection for people who are not in as good a position as a 
fully capable adult to take care for their own physical safety or to discern the 
 
 154 For example, research undertaken in the United States by Finley has shown that caps on non-
economic loss (one of the aspects of the Australian tort law reform) have a negative impact 
upon compensation for women as opposed to men: Lucinda M Finley, ‘The Hidden Victims 
of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the Elderly’ (2004) 53 Emory Law Journal 1263. 
 155 Koenig and Rustad, above n 39, 9. 
 156 Ipp Report, above n 9, x–xi. The fifth term of reference asked the Panel to: 
Develop and evaluate options for a limitation period of 3 years for all persons, while en-
suring appropriate protections are established for minors and disabled persons. In devel-
oping options the Panel must consider: (a) the relationship with limitation periods for 
other forms of action, for example arising under contract or statute; and (b) establishing 
the appropriate date when the limitation period commences. 
 157 Ibid 95–6 [6.48]. 
 158 Ibid 124 [8.12]. 
 159 Ibid 63 [4.14]. 
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risks of recreational activities in which they participate or which they ob-
serve.160 
The only mention of women specifically in the Ipp Report was in relation to 
the discussion of the rule in Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Commit-
tee161 as to liability in cases of professional negligence, and the 1988 report 
concerning the treatment of cervical cancer in New Zealand,162 where the 
authors pointed out that under the original formulation of the rule the 
practitioners who failed to treat women with cervical cancer would not have 
been negligent.163 
In the United States context, Koenig and Rustad suggest that tort reformers 
are ‘currently reshaping tort remedies in ways that will be contrary to women’s 
interests’.164 In Australia, the terms of reference of the Ipp Report were 
universally applied, beginning from an assumption that there was a need to 
limit ‘liability and quantum of damages arising from personal injury and 
death’.165 In this context, and in accord with Koenig and Rustad’s observation, 
it is important to note that certain legislative changes may act in the future to 
actively exclude women and children from personal injury litigation. 
An example of such change is the substantive legislative reforms, in some 
jurisdictions, which place a cap on damages for non-economic loss for 
personal injury or death.166 While such caps apply equally to all plaintiffs, the 
argument made by United States researchers such as Finley167 and Korzec168 is 
that such non-economic loss caps significantly disadvantage women. This is 
because the law of torts values loss of paid working capacity over other loss.169 
 
 160 Ibid. 
 161 [1957] 1 WLR 582, 587 (McNair J). 
 162 Committee of Inquiry into Allegations concerning the Treatment of Cervical Cancer at 
National Women’s Hospital and into Other Related Matters, The Report of the Cervical Cancer 
Inquiry (1988). 
 163 Ipp Report, above n 9, 39 [3.10]. 
 164 Koenig and Rustad, above n 39, 5. 
 165 Ipp Report, above n 9, 25 [1.3]. 
 166 See Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 16(2); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 
2003 (NT) s 27; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ss 61–2; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 52; 
Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 28G. 
 167 Finley, ‘The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform’, above n 154. 
 168 Rebecca Korzec, ‘Maryland Tort Damages: A Form of Sex-Based Discrimination’ (2007) 37 
University of Baltimore Law Forum 97. 
 169 See Lucinda M Finley, ‘Female Trouble: The Implications of Tort Reform for Women’ (1997) 
64 Tennessee Law Review 847. 
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As a result, incapacity caused by injuries to women is often categorised as 
non-economic loss. In addition, the law of torts has historically categorised 
the loss of a woman’s domestic working capacity (that is, being a housewife) as 
a loss to her husband of ‘servitium’ rather than to herself as a worker.170  
A further example of legislative change which disadvantages a minority is 
the requirement in New South Wales that minors who are in the custody of a 
‘capable parent or guardian’ do not have the benefit of the suspension of the 
limitation period.171 This change was based upon recommendation 25 of the 
Ipp Report, which was justified on the basis of ‘persuasive evidence from 
several sources about difficulties that are experienced by reason of the rule 
that limitation periods do not run against minors and mentally incapacitated 
persons’.172 The report gave two examples of such difficulties: public liability 
and professional indemnity insurers who would face uncertainty in assess-
ment of premiums; and obstetricians who may face a claim ‘20 years or more 
after the relevant event’, even after retirement.173 Despite stating that it was 
‘not in a position to verify this assertion’, the Panel recommended the change 
to the limitation period for minors, as ‘many people clearly perceive[d] it to be 
correct’.174 The time limit has been described as ‘not only both inefficient and 
ineffective, but also grossly unjust and ill-considered’ as it reduces the time 
available to gather evidence as to quantum of damages,175 meaning that 
parents may not be able to assert their child’s rights effectively within the 
reduced time frame. 
VI  C O N C LU SI O N  
The study of High Court negligence appeal cases in the first 11 years of the 
21st century demonstrates that the law of negligence does not generally favour 
plaintiffs, and that some groups of plaintiffs appear less often in negligence 
litigation before the High Court than others. However, it is important to 
observe that appeal cases are not representative of all cases and we should not 
‘ignore the problem of the representativeness of appellate decisions or 
 
 170 Graycar, ‘Hoovering as a Hobby and Other Stories’, above n 3, 26–31. 
 171 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50F(2)(a). This provision existed in Tasmania prior to the 2002 
reforms: Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) s 26(6). 
 172 Ipp Report, above n 9, 94 [6.41]. 
 173 Ibid 94–5 [6.42]–[6.43]. 
 174 Ibid 95 [6.44]. 
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presume representativeness’.176 Caution must be exercised in inferring, for 
example, that because there is a smaller number of personal injury cases 
involving women in the High Court than men, there must be fewer negligence 
actions instigated by women overall. At least three interrelated concerns arise 
from this study which merit future investigation: firstly, the issue of whether 
the ideology of the High Court favours personal responsibility, coupled with 
the future impact of the tort law reform legislation; secondly, the framework 
of the operation of tort law and resulting inequality more generally; and 
thirdly, in light of the two previous issues, the possibility of a renewal of calls 
for reform of the law of negligence. 
In relation to the first issue, this study identified that between 2000–10 
only one in three plaintiffs were successful in High Court appeals. As ob-
served in Part IV, it seems likely that Australian tort law reform will perpetu-
ate these unequal success rates of plaintiffs in appeals to the High Court. 
Justice Ipp, who chaired the Panel, was described in 2007 as having labelled 
the compensation laws which had been introduced as a result of the tort law 
reform legislation as ‘inconsistent, unbalanced and unfair to injured peo-
ple’.177 He has since observed that ‘[c]ertain of the statutory barriers that 
plaintiffs now face are inordinately high’.178 The pendulum of responsibility 
has clearly swung towards individual injured persons. 
In relation to the second issue of the framework of the law of tort, it is not 
yet evident whether certain classes of plaintiff — in particular women and 
children — are, or will be, more adversely affected than others by the tort law 
reforms. Part II of this article drew upon empirical material indicating that a 
negligence action may be dependent upon the nature, type and location of 
injury. These factors are biased as to both gender and age: that is, more men, 
than either women or children, suffer injuries in circumstances where the 
harm inflicted can be the subject of a claim in negligence. This evidence 
suggests structural differences based upon age and gender in the existing 
framework of tort law. Of course, as emphasised at the outset of this conclu-
 
 176 George L Priest and Benjamin Klein, ‘The Selection of Disputes for Litigation’ (Report, 
Institute for Civil Justice, RAND Corporation, 1984) 3. See also George L Priest and Benja-
min Klein, ‘The Selection of Disputes for Litigation’ (1984) 13 Journal of Legal Studies 1, 3. 
 177 Geoffrey Provis, ‘From the President: A Source Worth Saving’ (2007) 81(7) Law Institute 
Journal 4, 4, citing Justice David Ipp, ‘The Politics, Purpose and Reform of the Law of Negli-
gence’ (Paper presented at the Conference of the Australian Insurance Law Association, 
Noosa, 17 May 2007). 
 178 Justice D A Ipp, ‘The Metamorphosis of Slip and Fall’ (2007) 29 Australian Bar Review 150, 
150, quoting Justice David Ipp, ‘Themes in the Law of Torts’ (Speech delivered at the Confer-
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sion, limitations exist in extrapolating from the raw numbers in these rare 
cases of High Court appeals that develop the law of negligence. 
The system of tort litigation is expensive and slow, and a ‘significant num-
ber of people who are injured in an accident do not receive any compensa-
tion’.179 Part III of the article examined the obstacles in the way of all  
plaintiffs — and particularly to children and women — to commencing and 
pursuing litigation for personal injury. In New Zealand, the Royal Commis-
sion into compensation for personal injury — responsible for the introduction 
of the universal no-fault compensation scheme for accidents in that  
country — noted that ‘[t]he negligence action is a form of lottery’180 and, 
damningly, that ‘[t]he toll of personal injury is one of the disastrous incidents 
of social progress, and the statistically inevitable victims are entitled to receive 
a co-ordinated response from the nation as a whole’.181 
This then leads to the third point — that the time may be approaching to 
consider the possibility of a no-fault system in future reform of Australian tort 
law. This could be in the form of a universal compensation scheme,182 or 
further legislative reform to the law of negligence with emphasis placed upon 
procedural and substantive equity in access to compensation for the negligent 
acts of others. The data in this study evidence that the pendulum has well and 
truly swung away from what Kirby J called ‘communitarian concepts of 
mutual legal responsibility’183 for accident compensation. The success rate of 
defendants in this study underlines the shift in emphasis away from the 
community bearing the cost of personal injuries back to the individual taking 
personal responsibility. This raises the question as to whether the pendulum 
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2014] Lacunae and Litigants 191 
has swung too far and if the community should assume more responsibility 
for those catastrophically injured. 
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